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A. DUTY AND BREACH
EXAS courts had the opportunity to revisit the concepts of duty
and breach in the context of multiple causes of action, the compet-
itive sports doctrine and through independent contractors
throughout this Survey period.
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals distinguished between a breach
of contract action and one in tort in Parks v. DeWitt County Electric Co-
op., Inc.I The Parks sued DeWitt's County Electrical Co-op for damages
resulting from the destruction of several trees on the Parks' property.
The Parks accused the Co-op of breach of contract, DTPA violations, and
negligence. The court recognized that the contract between the parties
gave rise to both a breach of contract cause of action and a separate tort
claim. The duty not to destroy the Parks' trees arose independently of
the contract, and the damages were not exclusively limited to the subject
matter of the contract. Accordingly, the plaintiffs could simultaneously
pursue both causes of action under the separate duties owed by the
defendants. 2
In Moore v. Phi Delta Theta Co.,3 as a pledge to the defendant frater-
nity, the plaintiff voluntarily participated in a paintball "war" game. Dur-
ing the game, the plaintiff's eye goggles slipped off, and he was hit in the
eye with a paintball, blinding that eye. The plaintiff then sued the frater-
nity that sponsored the event. The fraternity used the theory of "compet-
itive contact sports doctrine," as its defense, arguing that its duty was
merely to avoid intentional or reckless injury to the participants in the
game. The appellate court disagreed, noting that the fraternity was not a
participant in the game and, thus, was not entitled to this modified duty;
instead, non-participating entities (such as sponsors) are to be tried on
concepts of ordinary negligence.4
In McCarty v. Barwood Homes Association,5 a painting contractor em-
ployed plaintiff to refurbish a tennis court and nearby light poles. While
on a scaffolding, plaintiff came into contact with a power line and re-
ceived severe electrical burns. In the suit against the premises owner and
the power company, plaintiff alleged violations of the Health and Safety
Code, which required property owners to notify power companies of
work to be accomplished near power lines. 6 Reciting the duties owed an
invitee by a landowner, the appellate court rejected arguments that the
power line was a premises defect; instead, the Houston Court of Appeals
1. 962 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, pet. granted).
2. See id. at 712.
3. 976 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. granted).
4. See id. at 742.
5. 981 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. filed).




held the plaintiff's injuries were the result of the activities of the painting
contractor, over whom the property owner had no control.7 However,
the court did extend the Health & Safety Code duties to the owner, find-
ing that the "person responsible for the work" and controlling the details
of the work did owe a duty to notify the power company of the proximity
of that work to the power line.8
B. CAUSATION
Interesting theories of res ipsa loquitor, foreseeability, and sequential
acts of negligence required Texas courts to consider the concept of causa-
tion. In one case, the plaintiff company purchased pipe from a nearby
supply company. When the pipe was discovered to be defective, the
plaintiff sued the supply company and several others involved in the chain
of distribution for the sale of the pipe.9 Using the theory of res ipsa lo-
quitor, the plaintiff argued that one or all of the defendants were negli-
gent in their inspection, storage, and delivery of the pipe. Since any one
of the defendants' negligence might have been the sole cause of the inju-
ries, the appellate court affirmed a summary judgment against the res ipsa
loquitor theory. Res ipsa loquitor is appropriate, according to the Hous-
ton Court of Appeals, only if the multiple defendants have simultaneous
joint control over the instrument. In this case, the several changes of pos-
session precluded such joint control and, thereby, precluded a multi-party
res ipsa loquitor theory.
In Rodriguez v. Moerbe,'0 someone broke into defendant's automo-
bile. As the defendant pulled along side a second vehicle filled with po-
tential suspects for the break-in, the second vehicle sped through a stop
sign and ran into the plaintiff's vehicle. The plaintiff sued the defendant
arguing that his negligence, in chasing the second vehicle, was the cause
of the accident. Recognizing that the "pursuit" by the defendant might
give rise to a foreseeable "flight", the San Antonio court held a duty was
owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. Further, the actions of the defend-
ant could be a direct and proximate cause of the accident, foreseeably
causing the "flight" of the second vehicle. The defendant's claim that the
second vehicle running the stop sign was a new and independent cause of
the accident was a fact question, best left to a jury, and precluding a sum-
mary judgment.
In Hall v. Huff' the plaintiff filed a medical negligence suit against a
physician and a subsequent treating hospital. The physician had misdiag-
nosed signs of renal failure, necessitating the transfer of the plaintiff to a
subsequent hospital; that hospital, in turn, failed to diagnose a cardiac
7. See id. at 349.
8. See id. at 352.
9. See Esco Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Sooner Pipe & Supply Corp., 962 S.W.2d 193 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).
10. 963 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied).
11. 957 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1997, writ denied).
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tamponade. In a vague motion for summary judgment, the physician ar-
gued that the sole cause of the plaintiff's subsequent death was the treat-
ment rendered by the hospital after the physician's treatment had ended.
Recognizing that survival causes of action still existed against the physi-
cian for the period of time prior to the plaintiff's death, and recognizing
that the apparent sole cause argument of the physician was not proven as
a matter of law, the appellate court reversed a summary judgment to al-
low a jury to resolve the fact questions.12
C. FORESEEABILITY OF THIRD-PARTY CAUSATION
In more refined causation arguments, the Houston First District Court
of Appeals, twice addressed a third party's involvement in wrongful death
cases. In Wilson v. Brister,13 the plaintiff brought a negligence suit
against a psychiatrist, claiming that the psychiatrist improperly treated
the depression of his daughter who committed suicide only days after the
counseling. The defendant was granted a summary judgment, having ar-
gued that a third party providing the gun and bullets to the daughter was
an unforeseeable, intervening criminal act that defeated any causation on
the psychiatrist's part. Reversing, the Houston Court of Appeals noted
that the exact manner of the daughter's suicide (borrowing a gun) need
not be foreseeable in a negligence action against the psychiatrist for fail-
ure to prevent any suicide through counseling.
In Carreiro v. Wiley,14 the plaintiff's daughter was murdered while visit-
ing a friend's house. The defendants were the parents of the friend, who
had left the seven- and ten-year-old girls home alone, and unsupervised.
Granting a summary judgment, the trial court held that the criminal con-
duct of the murderer was the superseding and sole cause of the girl's
death. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the criminal conduct
was the foreseeable result of the negligence of the parents in leaving the
young girls home alone. 15
D. PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE
1. Medical Malpractice
With no substantive changes to Article 4590i during the Survey period,
Texas courts found more procedural issues to address during 1998 in the
medical malpractice arena. In Andrade Garcia v. Columbia Medical
Center,16 the plaintiff underwent prostate surgery and was improperly in-
tubated prior to the surgery, which resulted in his suffocation, cardiac
12. For further discussion on causation, see Mikolajczyk v. Salazar, 966 S.W.2d 711(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet. h.) and Schorlemer v. Reyes, 974 S.W.2d 141 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied).
13. 982 S.W.2d 42 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).
14. 976 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. App.-Houston fist Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).
15. For further discussion on the foreseeability of third-party causation, see Prather v.
Brandt, 981 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).
16. 996 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. Tex. 1998).
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arrest, and ultimate death. During the course of discovery in this federal
lawsuit, plaintiffs uncovered evidence that the hospital knew within hours
of the surgery that the plaintiff was brain dead since the hospital had
taken a clandestine EEG; however, the hospital failed to reveal this infor-
mation or the results of the test to the plaintiff's family. Seeking permis-
sion to add causes of action for fraud, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, conspiracy, and other theories of liability, the federal district
court granted permission for the plaintiffs to amend their complaint. The
defendants unsuccessfully argued that all of the various causes of action
were subsumed by Article 4590i into simple negligence actions. The
court, recognizing that concealing the information known about the
plaintiff's brain death did not relate to a "health care" claim, allowed
plaintiff's fraud, conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
and punitive damages theories to be amended into the complaint as sepa-
rate causes of action. 17
In Mikolajczyk v. Salazar,18 a medical negligence suit, the plaintiffs
claimed that the defendant doctor breached the applicable standard of
care by prescribing hormones without first ruling out the potential for the
plaintiff's pregnancy, which later proved positive. The defendant moved
for summary judgment, supported by his own affidavit, arguing a lack of
evidence to link the hormones taken by the plaintiff to the testicular can-
cer diagnosed in her son after birth. The defendant's affidavit failed to
establish his expertise in the field of obstetrics, and instead admitted that
his field of practice was in the termination of pregnancies. More impor-
tantly, the sole basis for the motion was a lack of evidence to establish the
causative link between the prescribed hormones and the baby's cancer;
since the burden of disproving that element of the plaintiff's cause of ac-
tion was not established from the affidavits, the summary judgment was
reversed.
In Boren v. Bullen,19 the plaintiff sued his doctor for medical negli-
gence. The doctor filed a motion for summary judgment, denying any
violation of the applicable standard of care. As a specialist in infectious
diseases, the defendant's doctor appended his own affidavit to support his
motion. In response, the plaintiffs filed affidavits from three separate ex-
perts-none of whom had practiced medicine for infectious diseases, nor
professed any knowledge of the applicable standard of care for an infec-
tious disease physician. The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals affirmed
the summary judgment for lack of appropriate expert evidence regarding
violations of the defendant doctor's standard of care.
In Jones v. Miller,20 the plaintiff was suffering from foot pain, and saw
Dr. Miller for treatment. Dr. Miller performed surgery to remove a bun-
ion from Jones' foot. After a follow up appointment, Dr. Miller declared
17. See id. at 616.
18. 966 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet. h.).
19. 972 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet. h.).
20. 966 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1998, no pet. h.).
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Jones' foot healed and instructed her to begin walking on it. After re-
peated pain drove Jones to seek a second opinion, she discovered her foot
had not properly healed, resulting in this misdiagnosis lawsuit against Dr.
Miller. In an affidavit supporting his motion for summary judgment, Dr.
Miller was quite specific in describing the applicable standard of care and
how he satisfied that standard in many areas of his treatment for Jones;
however, Dr. Miller did not specifically describe the standard of care in
post-operative follow-up nor how he claimed to have satisfied that stan-
dard. Consequently, Dr. Miller's summary judgment was reversed for
lack of an adequate and specific description of the applicable standard of
care and satisfaction of same for the relevant time period.
In Schorelemer v. Reyes,21 the plaintiff, a patient of the defendant-phy-
sician, brought a medical malpractice action against the physician for im-
proper diagnosis, negligently removing an ovary, fallopian tube, and her
appendix, and leaving a sponge in her abdomen. The San Antonio Court
of Appeals, in affirming the trial court, held that the plaintiff was entitled
to a res ipsa loquitur instruction and the evidence supported a finding of
negligence on the defendant's part. Res ipsa loquitur applies only when:
(1) the character of the accident is such that it would not ordinarily occur
in the absence of negligence; and (2) the instrumentality causing the in-
jury is shown to have been under the management and control of the
defendant. 22 Although res ipsa is generally inapplicable to medical mal-
practice cases, res ipsa is applicable where the "nature of the alleged mal-
practice and injuries are plainly within the common knowledge of
laymen, requiring no expert testimony. ' 23 The evidence regarding the
defendant's failure to remove the sponge satisfied the above standards
and the court held that the evidence was both legally and factually suffi-
cient to support the verdict under the negligence theory for failure to
remove the sponge.
2. Legal Malpractice
Traditional concepts of legal malpractice were addressed during the
survey period with some sobering explanations of the duties owed to
those outside the traditional attorney-client relationship. In First Na-
tional Bank of Durant v. Douglass,24 a borrower hired the defendant-at-
torney to obtain a title opinion. The lender, relying upon the same
opinion, extended the loan to the borrower. After the borrower later
defaulted, the lender sued the borrower and the defendant attorney. Re-
versing a summary judgment granted to the defendant attorney, the Fifth
Circuit held that the actions of the defendant attorney could be pursued
under a negligent misrepresentation theory. Although the lender was not
privy to the attorney-client relationship, the defendant attorney did owe
21. 974 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied).
22. See id. at 145.
23. Id. at 145 (citing Haddock v. Arnspiger, 793 S.W.2d 948, 951 (Tex. 1990)).
24. 142 F.3d 802 (5th Cir. 1998).
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"an independent duty based on the attorney's manifest awareness of
plaintiff's reliance on the representation and intention that the plaintiff so
rely."'25 The factors enumerated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts
§552, as adopted by the Texas Supreme Court in Federal Land Bank As-
sociation of Tyler v. Sloane,26 supported such an action for negligent mis-
representation even without an attorney-client relationship.
In Goggin v. Grimes,27 the plaintiff retained the attorney Grimes to
represent her in a divorce case. Grimes later withdrew from representa-
tion but intervened in the divorce action seeking attorney's fees. The fi-
nal judgment in the divorce action awarded Grimes the fees, and no
appeal was taken from that judgment by the plaintiff. This separate suit
was instituted one-year later, directly against Grimes for legal malprac-
tice. Grimes argued that the malpractice claim was a compulsory counter-
claim to the fee dispute and, since no appeal was taken from the divorce
judgment, that final judgment awarding attorney's fees was res judicata to
this later malpractice claim. Affirming the summary judgment for
Grimes, the Houston Court of Appeals recognized that the legal malprac-
tice claims all arose from the same transaction as described by Rule 97(a)
of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which had been litigated to a final
resolution and barred this second suit.28
In Smith v. Flinn,29 the plaintiff retained Flinn to investigate potential
breaches of a home repair contract. Although the true nature and extent
of the attorney-client relationship was in dispute, no suit was filed within
the four-year statute of limitations against the contractor for the potential
breach. Nearly three-years after the statute had passed, the plaintiff filed
suit against Flinn alleging malpractice for allowing the statute of limita-
tions to expire. Noting that the legal malpractice statute of limitations is
only two-years, the court of appeals affirmed a summary judgment for
Flinn. Plaintiff's attempts to invoke the discovery rule were unpersua-
sive, as the plaintiff could provide no explanation for why she had under-
taken no inquiry or investigation into the status of her potential claim for
seven years.
In Baker v. Mallios,30 the Dallas Court of Appeals held that public
policy concerns did not preclude the plaintiff in a legal malpractice action
from assigning a portion of his recovery to a third party. In this case, the
third party financed the plaintiff's legal malpractice action in exchange
for the assignment. The general rule in Texas is that causes of action are
assignable. 31 An exception to the general rule is that legal malpractice
claims are not assignable. The public policy concerns of role reversal,
availability of legal services, collusion, zealous advocacy, and marketplace
25. Id. at 809.
26. 825 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1991),
27. 969 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet. h.).
28. See id. at 137.
29. 968 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet. h.).
30. 971 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. App. - Dallas 1998, pet. granted).
31. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §12.014 (Vernon 1984).
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did not "support a prohibition against a plaintiff assigning to a third party
a portion of any proceeds he recovers in his legal malpractice claim
against his own attorney. '32
In City of Garland v. Booth,33 the defendants were attorneys at a law
firm that had previously represented the City of Garland. The defend-
ants were approached regarding the possibility of representing some
neighboring cities against Garland regarding waste water disputes. After
confirming that none of the current attorneys in the firm had ever repre-
sented Garland and that none had ever received confidential information
regarding Garland, the defendant attorneys agreed to represent the
neighboring cities. In that lawsuit, Garland moved to disqualify the de-
fendant attorneys, based on their firm's prior representation of Garland.
After a ten-day evidentiary hearing, the motion was granted. Shortly
thereafter, the case settled including the assignment to Garland of any
legal malpractice claims against the defendant attorneys. In this subse-
quent action by Garland for legal malpractice, the defendant attorneys
moved for summary judgment on the basis that the assignment of a legal
malpractice claim violates public policy. Reciting the body of law to that
effect, and the rationale prohibiting such assignments, the Dallas Court of
Appeals affirmed the summary judgment.
3. Counseling Malpractice
In Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church,34 the plaintiffs filed a civil
rights and a negligence suit against their employer, Casa View Baptist
Church, and against their minister. All causes of action arose out of the
minister's marital counseling of the plaintiffs. In appealing the jury's
$85,000 verdict, the defendants argued that the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution barred any suit arising out of the religious pas-
toral services provided by the minister to the plaintiffs. The court, how-
ever, held that although the minister occasionally referenced scripture in
his counseling sessions, the underlying purpose of the counseling was sec-
ular in nature and not religious; thus, the protections of the First Amend-
ment were unavailable. Citing the holding of the district court, the Fifth
Circuit ruled that defendant's arguments "reflected the obvious truth that
the activities complained of by the plaintiffs were not part of his religious
beliefs and practices and he is not so brazen as to now contend other-
Wise." '35 Accordingly, the jury's verdict against the minister and the other
defendants was affirmed.
4. Medical Malpractice/Statute of Limitations
The statute of limitations in medical negligence cases surfaced often in
32. Baker, 971 S.W.2d at 587 (emphasis added).
33. 971 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1998, pet. denied).
34. 134 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub nom, Baucum v. Sanders, 119 S. Ct.
161 (1998).
35. Id. at 338.
1350 [Vol. 52
PERSONAL TORTS
the appellate courts. In Martin v. Catterson,36 two different dermatolo-
gists treated the plaintiff for a scalp condition and diagnosed a benign
skin condition. Later, a third dermatologist found the condition to be
cancerous. Suit was filed against the first two pursuant to the discovery
rule provided by the Open Court's provision of the Texas Constitution.
During the pendency of the suit, the plaintiff died. His survivors
amended the petition to include the new wrongful death and survivorship
actions against the same defendants. Moving for summary judgment, the
defendants argued that the wrongful death and survival actions were
barred by the two-year statute of limitations, having been "filed" more
than two-years after the date of last treatment. The court held that
[s]uch a result would reward negligent doctors for the death of their
patients. For no good reason, such a rule would make it cheaper in
some cases (like this one) to kill a patient than to maim him. Fur-
ther, it would encourage the defendants to prolong litigation in the
hope that a plaintiff's claim would die with him.37
For the foregoing reasons, the summary judgment in favor of the defend-
ants was reversed, allowing the amendment.
In Ratliff v. Earle,38 after more than two years of treatment, including
two major surgeries, the plaintiff discontinued care and treatment by the
defendant doctor. Shortly after her second surgery by the defendant doc-
tor implanting certain medical devices in the plaintiff's spine, the plaintiff
saw a television program describing the inappropriateness of the devices
for that use. Within three-months, the plaintiff filed suit against the de-
fendant doctor. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on
the basis of the two-year statute of limitations. Arguing that the only
readily ascertainable date of treatment from the defendant was the last
day the plaintiff was seen, the plaintiff invoked the continuing course of
treatment doctrine, 39 as the accrual date for the statute of limitations.
The court of appeals recognized that the continuing course of treatment
issue, revolving around when the treatment for the particular injury ac-
crued, is necessarily a fact specific question depending upon the events of
each particular case. Because several items of evidence contained in the
record could well support the jury finding a continuing course of treat-
ment by the defendant doctor, the summary judgment was reversed, al-
lowing the amendment of the petition.
In Hyson v. Chilkewitz,40 the plaintiff filed this medical negligence law-
suit against several different entities involved with his surgery. The plain-
tiff argued his electrical burns were the result of medical malfeasance.
More than two-years and seventy-five days after the injury, plaintiff
amended his petition to join an additional medical association. To avoid
the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff argued that
36. 981 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet. h.).
37. Id. at 225-26.
38. 961 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, pet. granted).
39. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art 4590i § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 1999).
40. 971 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1998, pet. granted).
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the association was already a party through its sole shareholder, and that
the legal theories of misnomer and misidentification should therefore toll
the applicable statute of limitations. Strictly interpreting the continuing
course of treatment doctrine, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that the
two-year limitations (or, more appropriately, one-day short of two-years)
applied to the plaintiff's amendment "notwithstanding any other law."'41
Therefore, the legal theories of misnomer and misidentification, inter-
preted as "other laws," could not be used to extend the statute of
limitations.
In Slater v. National Medical Enterprises, Inc. ,42 the plaintiff sued a psy-
chiatrist and several psychiatric facilities alleging fraudulent schemes to
provide plaintiff with unwanted and unneeded medical treatment to con-
fine her in the facilities, and also that the psychiatrist had committed mal-
practice in her psychiatric care. The suit was filed nearly six years after
the plaintiff's last admission and treatment by the doctor had ended. Ar-
guing the statute of limitations should be tolled by the Open Court's pro-
vision of the Texas Constitution, or tolled through the fraudulent
concealment by the defendants, plaintiff sought a reversal of the summary
judgment granted in favor of the defendants. The Fort Worth Court of
Appeals affirmed, recognizing that the medical negligence allegations ac-
crued on the date of last treatment and that the plaintiff had provided no
facts to indicate that her injuries were unknown or unknowable. Further,
the fraud cause of action expired four years from the last treatment, and
again no facts would support the plaintiff's discovery rule tolling of the
statute of limitations.
In Jones v. Miller,43 the plaintiff sued the defendant psychiatrist, alleg-
ing failure to diagnose the cause of her multiple personality disorder.
Appealing the trial court's granting of summary judgment based on the
two year statute of limitations, the plaintiff argued that the trial court
should have tolled her statute because she was of "unsound mind" pursu-
ant to section 16.001 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code. Re-
viewing the summary judgment evidence on file at the time of the
hearing, including the affidavit of the plaintiff's husband, the court af-
firmed the summary judgment for lack of competent evidence to establish
the plaintiff's unsound mind.
In Savage v. Psychiatric Institute of Bedford," Savage was suffering
from depression and anxiety from family and relationship difficulties
when she was a teenager. She was encouraged by family to be evaluated
at the defendant's facility. That evaluation resulted in the recommenda-
tion that Savage voluntarily commit herself to the facility, which she did.
She was discharged about six weeks later, and turned eighteen more than
two years after the discharge. On the eve of her 21st birthday, more than
41. Id. at 566.
42. 962 S.W.2d 228 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, pet. denied).
43. 964 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet. h.).
44. 965 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, pet. denied).
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five years after her discharge, Savage filed suit against the facility for
fraudulently inducing her to admit herself and claiming that she was
treated poorly while a resident, and medical negligence. Affirming the
defendant's summary judgment, the court held that her medical negli-
gence actions accrued on her 18th birthday, and the statute of limitations
therefore expired on her 20th birthday; further, the "fraud" cause of ac-
tion was subsumed by the continuing course of treatment doctrine, and




Issues of malice and various qualified immunities became crucial in
several defamation suits published last year. In a defamation suit arising
out of the 1993 Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) raid on
the Branch Davidian compound, the Supreme Court of Texas decided
whether a media plaintiff, one of only a few journalists to report live from
the compound, whose reports were rebroadcast worldwide, and who will-
ingly gave numerous interviews about his role in the failed raid, was a
public figure. 45 The plaintiff sued WFAA-TV in Dallas alleging that its
news reports concerning his role in the failed raid damaged his reputation
in the community. The Texas Supreme Court specifically held that the
plaintiff became a limited-purpose public figure after thrusting himself to
the forefront of the controversy surrounding the failed raid. Public
figures must prove that the defendant acted with actual malice during the
alleged defamation.46 "Actual malice" requires a showing that the de-
fendant "entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication"
and published the statement "with the knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."' 47 Based on the affida-
vit of a WFAA reporter, the court held that WFAA established as a mat-
ter of law that it did not act with actual malice in reporting the ATF's
investigation into why the raid failed.
The plaintiff, in Yeager v. TRW Inc.,48 brought a lawsuit against a
credit reporting agency alleging, inter alia, defamation after the defend-
ant published four inaccurate credit reports to lenders with whom the
plaintiff had applied for credit. The district court held that qualified im-
munity protected the credit reporting agency based on the plaintiff's con-
sent to publication of the information; because the agency did not act
with malice in publishing three reports before the agency had notice of
the reports' inaccuracy; therefore, it could not have defamed the plaintiff.
The district court further held that summary judgment was inappropriate
regarding the fourth publication. A fact issue existed as to whether the
45. WFAA-TV, Inc. v. McLemore, 978 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. 1998).
46. See id. at 573.
47. Id. at 584.
48. 984 F. Supp. 517 (E.D. Tex. 1997).
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agency acted with reckless disregard with respect to the fourth report,
which was published after the agency had notice of the report's false in-
formation. ("Reckless disregard" is a high degree of awareness of prob-
able falsity.) If the plaintiff can show that the defendant acted with
reckless disregard, plaintiff will overcome defendant's qualified
immunity.
An assistant superintendent for business services for the Tyler In-
dependent School District filed suit for defamation and intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress against a television station and other parties
connected to the defendant. In Beck v. Lone Star Broadcasting Co.,49 the
Tyler Court of Appeals held that the assistant superintendent was a pub-
lic official for defamation purposes, which requires a showing of "actual
malice." The reporter's use of the words "bid-rigging" and "racketeer-
ing" were sufficiently close to the allegations made by a school board
member against the assistant superintendent to negate any suggestion of
reckless disregard for the truth. Plaintiff's allegations of the television
station's failure to investigate, insufficient proofreading, or negligent
training did not establish actual malice required for a defamation claim
brought by a public official.
In Swate v. Schiffers,50 a physician brought a libel per se action against
a newspaper, publisher, and reporter for a published article that allegedly
contained false statements. The crux of the article reported that the phy-
sician had failed to practice medicine in an acceptable manner, that the
physician was on probationary status, that the hospital had terminated
the physician's employment, and that the physician was suing the hospi-
tal. According to the evidence, the article was substantially true. More-
over, the court held that the article was a privileged publication because
the physician was a limited-purpose public figure and the article was a
reasonable and fair comment on a judicial proceeding, and matters of
public concern. The physician in this case failed to establish that the arti-
cle was published with malice, as required for a public figure.
In Attaya v. Shoukfeh,51 a physician sued another physician for, inter
alia, furnishing information against the plaintiff to the State Board of
Medical Examiners in bad faith, defamation, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and malicious prosecution. The Amarillo Court of
Appeals held that the qualified immunity provisions of the Medical Prac-
tice Act did not afford the plaintiff a private cause of action against an-
other physician for allegedly supplying information to the State Board of
Medical Examiners in bad faith or with malice. Moreover, the qualified
immunity provisions did not supersede the common law absolute immu-
nity doctrine protecting a physician's statements provided to the Board
49. 970 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. App.-Tuler 1998, writ denied),
50. 975 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. App. - San Antonio 1998, writ denied),
51. 962 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1998, writ denied),
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from becoming the basis for any civil liability.52
B. INTENTIONAL INFLIcTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Intentional infliction of emotional distress claims were addressed often,
and typically as collateral claims to another cause of action such as defa-
mation or sexual harassment. In Tompkins v. Cyr,53 a physician and his
spouse brought a tort action against anti-abortion activists and organiza-
tions who had conducted a long-term campaign of picketing and other
conduct directed at plaintiffs' home, church, and workplace. The case
was originally filed in state court and was removed to federal court after
the plaintiffs amended their pleadings to include a RICO claim. The
plaintiffs alleged causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, invasion of privacy, and civil conspiracy. The district court held
that imposing tort liability for focused picketing and threatening conduct
did not violate the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Additionally, as to most defendants, the evidence supported verdicts on
theories of intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy,
and civil conspiracy. The district court further stated that, in a manner
consistent with the First Amendment, focused residential picketing may
be banned entirely and need not be tolerated in a civilized society.54 Be-
cause of the dangers posed to society by focused residential picketing, the
district court found that any actions of focused residential picketing con-
stituted sufficiently extreme and outrageous conduct to support claims of
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The district court, in Scribner v. Waffle House, Inc.,55 held that the sex-
ually harassing conduct in this case supported a finding of intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress. The plaintiff brought this action against her
former employer, alleging Title VII and state sexual harassment viola-
tions, in addition to a state law claim for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. Texas courts have found extreme and outrageous conduct
even where the harassment did not reach the atrocious levels of this case.
The district court further concluded that plaintiff's harassers caused her
severe emotional distress after considering the intensity and duration of
the distress. The extreme and outrageous character of the defendant's
conduct is, in itself, important evidence that distress existed, but the
plaintiff need not prove the distress had physical manifestations.
Parents of elementary school students, as next friends, alleged federal
statutory and constitutional causes of action, in addition to a Texas state
52. For further discussion on defamation, see Beck v. Lone Star Broadcasting Co., 970
S.W.2d 610 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1998, writ denied) and Rodriguez v. Sarabyn, 129 F.3d 760
(5th Cir. 1997).
53. 995 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Tex. 1998).
54. The court distinguished however, between "focused" picketing and other types of
residential picketing. The court held that while the protesters had the right to march up
and down the street, they did not have right to remain directly in front of the physician's
house. See id. at 678-79.
55. 14 F. Supp.2d 873 (N.D. Tex. 1998)
1999] 1355
SMU LAW REVIEW
law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against the Beau-
mont Independent School District, principal and teacher in Doe v. Beau-
mont Independent School District.56 The causes of action arose out of the
alleged sexual abuse of the students by a teacher. The district court
stated that the test is whether the conduct towards another person is so
extreme and egregious as to be beyond the bounds of decent society.
Under this standard, a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether
the conduct of the abusive teacher was sufficiently extreme and outra-
geous. The district court further held that, as a matter of law, the princi-
pal's failure to report the alleged abuse did not constitute extreme and
outrageous conduct. The standard of extreme and outrageous conduct is
higher than deliberate indifference.
In Hart v. O'Brien,57 an arrestee sued an assistant county attorney, var-
ious state narcotics officers, and sheriff's deputies, alleging that her arrest
and search violated her constitutional rights, and violated state laws
against, inter alia, intentional infliction of emotional distress and mali-
cious prosecution. With respect to the intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim, the Fifth Circuit held that plaintiff's allegations do not state
a claim because the arrest warrant commanded the officers to arrest her.
It continued, stating conduct that is required or authorized by law cannot
be extreme or outrageous. Furthermore, the plaintiff could not recover
for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on a federal hold
because the hold lasted only one day. As a matter of law, any alleged
distress was not sufficiently severe. In addition, the claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress was insufficient based on an arrest without
probable cause because there was no evidence that the officers did not
reasonably believe they had probable cause to seek a warrant. The rec-
ord contained no evidence that the officers executed the warrant
unreasonably.
In Beck v. Lone Star Broadcasting Co.,58 an assistant superintendent
for business services for the Tyler Independent School District filed suit
for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress against a
television station and other parties connected to the defendant. A claim
for the intentional infliction of emotional distress requires the plaintiff to
prove that the defendant: (1) acted intentionally or recklessly; (2) in an
extreme and outrageous manner; (3) that caused plaintiff to suffer emo-
tional distress; (4) that was severe.59 The Tyler Court of Appeals in this
case held that the reporters' references to alleged racketeering and bid-
rigging did not constitute sufficiently extreme and outrageous conduct to
sustain a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
In Brandes v. Rice Trust, Inc.,60 a testator's sister and her children
56. 8 F. Supp.2d 596, 615 (E.D. Tex. 1998).
57. 127 F.3d 424 (5th Cir. 1997).
58. 970 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. App.-'yer 1998, pet. denied).
59. See id. at 619.
60. 966 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).
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brought an action against Rice University alleging, in part, intentional
infliction of emotional distress based on a deathbed gift by the testator to
Rice University. The Houston Court of Appeals held that summary judg-
ment in favor of Rice University was proper because the University,
through its agents, was exercising its legal right to accept a gift from the
testator to the University. In Texas, there is no liability for intentional
infliction of emotional distress where an actor solely exercises his legal
rights.61
In Dancy v. Fina Oil & Chemical Co.,62 after the defendant published
a list of employees with excessive absences, the employees brought a law-
suit against their employer alleging intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress and invasion of privacy. The district court held that the publication
of the list was not actionable as intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress.63 The court stated that the cause of action does not protect against
mere insults, indignities, and threats and the cause of action will not lie
for "mere employment disputes. '64 The district court believed that the
list was a reasonable manner in which to inform department managers
regarding employees that needed to be counseled for attendance im-
provement. The district court concluded that the publication of the list
did not rise to the level of outrageous or intolerable conduct required to
prevail on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.65
C. PREMISES LIABILITY
Several interesting approaches to traditional premises liability cases
were published in 1998, reflecting creativity that met with varying degrees
of success. In Collard v. Interstate Northborough Partners,66 the plaintiffs
filed suit against a maintenance company for a slip and fall in the rest-
room of a building maintained by the defendant company. Appealing the
defendant's summary judgment, the plaintiffs argued that the condition of
the floor was created by the defendant and was not the result of a foreign
substance that was or should have been discovered by the defendant. 67
Since the condition of the surface of the floor was created by the defend-
ant, there was at least some evidence that the defendant knew or should
have known of the dangerous condition, warranting reversal of the sum-
mary judgment to allow a jury's determination of the Kroger elements. 68
In CMH Homes, Inc. v. Daenen,69 the plaintiff was making a delivery
to a storage trailer on the defendant's property when the steps to the
trailer collapsed, resulting in back injuries to the plaintiff. In this prem-
61. See id. at 147.
62. 3 F. Supp.2d 737 (E.D. Tex. 1997).
63. See id. at 740.
64. Id. at 739
65. See id. at 739.
66. 961 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1998, no pet. h.).
67. See id. at 704.
68. See Keetch v. Kroger Co., 845 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex. 1992).
69. 971 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1998, pet. filed),
1999] 1357
SMU LAW REVIEW
ises liability case, the land owner argued that it had no actual or construc-
tive knowledge of the condition of the steps in the time period
immediately preceding the accident. Recognizing that the defendant
placed the steps in use for invitees, maintained the steps, replaced the
steps on a regular basis, and knew the steps had to be used to access the
trailer, the Beaumont Court of Appeals affirmed judgment for the plain-
tiff.70 The dangerous condition of the premises did not result from an
unnoticed foreign substance, but instead from an absolutely predictable
result of wear and tear on the stairs. As such, the plaintiffs did not have
to show actual or constructive knowledge on the part of the defendant in
the moments prior to the accident. The plaintiffs merely had to show the
foreseeable results of the deteriorating condition and the lack of appro-
priate remedial measures to identify the danger.71
In Hirabayashi v. North Main Bar-B-Que, Inc.,72 after finishing lunch,
the plaintiff departed the premises of the defendant's restaurant and
walked across the street toward a vacant lot neither owned nor operated
by the defendant. A car struck the plaintiff while he was crossing the
street. In this premises liability case, plaintiff argued that the restaurant
owed an "assumed duty" to its invitees to provide safe access to and from
the lot.73 The court affirmed the summary judgment for the defendant
because of the lack of evidence that any recognized "assumed duties"
applied to this defendant, such as the duty not to create a dangerous con-
dition off-premises or the duty not to obscure off-premises dangers.74
D. PRODucTs LIABILITY
In Hyundai Motor Co. v. Alvarado,75 the plaintiff brought a products
liability and negligence action against Hyundai Motor Company on
grounds that the defendant's two-point passive seat belt system, which
did not include a lap belt, was defective in that it failed to restrain the
passenger. The Supreme Court of Texas held that the common law claims
of products liability and negligence were neither expressly nor impliedly
preempted by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (Safety
Act) 76 and its implementing standards. In light of the language used in
the Safety Act's express preemption clause, the savings clause, and the
Safety Act's legislative history, the court did not find "an unambiguous
congressional mandate" congressional intent to preempt the plaintiff's
claims. 77 In addition, the court held that the Safety Act does not preempt
the entire field of vehicle safety because Congress has not pervasively
70. See id. at 190.
71. See CMH Homes, Inc., 971 S.W.2d at 189.
72. 977 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, pet. denied).
73. See id. at 706.
74. See id. at 707.
75. 974 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1998).
76. See id. at 12-13.
77. See id. at 13.
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regulated vehicle safety. 78 Moreover, imposing tort liability on manufac-
turers is not inconsistent with Congress' desire to encourage innovation
and competition in vehicle safety.79
In Fuller-Austin Insulation Co. v. Bilder,80 plaintiff brought suit against
an asbestos manufacturer for injuries she suffered from childhood expo-
sure to asbestos on the work clothing of her stepfather. In this appeal of
the trial court's judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the asbestos manufac-
turer argued it owed no duty to the plaintiff, as plaintiff's exposure to the
asbestos was unforeseeable. On both the product liability theory alleging
market defect, and the negligence action, the Beaumont Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff. "Recovery under the strict
liability doctrine is not limited to users and consumers." 8' Likewise, the
duty of ordinary care would extend to those plaintiffs foreseeably ex-
posed to the asbestos dust on the work clothing of employees. 82
In General Motors Corp. v. Castaneda,8 3 a motorist who was injured in
an automobile collision sued the other driver, alleging negligence, and the
automobile manufacturer, alleging that her vehicle was not crashworthy.
The San Antonio Court of Appeals held that legally sufficient evidence
supported the jury's finding that the defective design of the vehicle's door
latch rendered the vehicle uncrashworthy and caused or enhanced the
plaintiff's injuries. 84 In crashworthiness cases, the "jury apportions re-
sponsibility between all whose action or products combine to cause the
entirety of the plaintiff's injuries and the defect need only be a producing
cause of the injury. '85 However, this case was remanded because the
court held that the mere fact that one of the defendant's automobile deal-
erships was located in the forum county did not establish that the dealer-
ship was an agent or representative of the manufacturer for venue
purposes.86 The court concluded that there was no evidence to support
the trial court's conclusion that the dealership in the forum county was
the agent or representative for General Motors.87
E. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
Like defamation, perceived victims turned to actions for malicious
prosecution to remedy their injuries. In Alvarez v. Anesthesiology Asso-
ciates,88 a mother of an infant child and her parents brought an action
against a hospital and its physicians for, inter alia, malicious prosecution
and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiffs claimed
78. See id. at 9.
79. See id. at 11.
80. 960 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1998, pet. granted and case abated).
81. Id. at 918.
82. See id.
83. 980 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. filed).
84. See id. at 781.
85. Id. at 780-81.
86. See id. at 783.
87. See id. at 786.
88. 967 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet. h.).
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that the physicians had made a report to Child Protective Services to
cover up their own negligence in treating the child. With respect to the
malicious prosecution claim, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held
that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether one doctor
acted in good faith when he made a report of child abuse against the
mother.8 9 All the defendants in this case claimed immunity from mali-
cious prosecution under the mandatory child abuse reporting provisions
of the Texas Family Code. Bad faith and malice are elements of a mali-
cious prosecution claim that are not properly disposed of by summary
judgment because they entail the evaluation of intent. 911 The initial pre-
sumption in malicious prosecution claims is that the defendant acted in
good faith and had probable cause to initiate or procure the prosecution.
The plaintiff successfully rebuts the presumption if the plaintiff produces
evidence that the motives, grounds, beliefs, and other actions of the de-
fendant did not constitute probable cause. 9'1
In Hart v. O'Brien,92 an arrestee sued various assistant county attor-
neys, state narcotics officers, and sheriff's deputies alleging that the arrest
and search violated her constitutional rights, and violated state laws
against malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress. With respect to the malicious prosecution claim, the Fifth Circuit
held that the inclusion of inaccurate statements in a warrant for probable
cause and the failure to produce exculpatory evidence do not state a
claim for malicious prosecution under Texas law.93 The officers did not
intentionally or recklessly include inaccurate statements, and therefore,
as a matter of law plaintiff could not show the malice required against a
public officer.
F. INTENTIONAL TORTS AND DISCRIMINATION
In LC v. AD,9 4 the adult plaintiff filed this action against her father for
sexual abuse when the plaintiff was a child. The trial court granted sum-
mary judgment for the father on the statute of limitations-the suit was
filed more than two years after LC's 18th birthday. LC's response alleged
that she first discovered (recalled) the abuse after the statute of limita-
tions expired, and that she should have a two year period from that dis-
covery to institute suit. In reviewing the evidence, the Dallas Court of
Appeals found that LC had sufficient information from several different
psychologists and counselors to put her on reasonable notice of the child-
hood abuse more than two years prior to her filing the petition, and the
court therefore affirmed the defendant's summary judgment. 95
89. See id. at 879.
90. See id. at 876.
91. See id. at 877.
92. 127 F.3d 424 (5th Cir. 1997, pet. denied).
93. See id. at 451.
94. 971 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, pet. denied).




A. GOVERNMENTAL AND OFFICIAL IMMUNITY
Government officials were often the subject of appellate court opinions
during the survey period. In Harris County v. Garza,96 the plaintiffs
brought action against Harris County to recover damages arising from an
automobile accident involving a deputy constable who was responding to
an emergency call. The jury found both the constable and the plaintiff
negligent. Government employees are entitled to official immunity from
suit arising from the performance of their: (1) discretionary duties in; (2)
good faith as long as they are; (3) acting within the scope of their author-
ity.97 The Houston Court of Appeals held that the trial court's finding
that the deputy acted in good faith, which supported the deputy's claim of
official immunity, rendered immaterial the trial court's finding that the
deputy acted negligently.98 Moreover, the court held that the deputy's
act of driving at a high rate of speed to the scene of a reported emergency
was a discretionary act.99 The county could not be held liable for the
deputy's negligent acts because the deputy satisfied the elements to qual-
ify for official immunity.
In City of San Antonio v. Garcia,100 a motorist brought an action under
the Texas Tort Claims Act alleging that the City of San Antonio and a
police officer were liable for injuries that the plaintiff suffered during an
arrest following a traffic stop. The San Antonio Court of Appeals held
that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the police of-
ficer acted in good faith when he arrested the plaintiff following a traffic
violation. The test for good faith is whether a reasonably prudent officer
under the same or similar circumstances would have acted in the same or
similar manner. 10 1 Whether the plaintiff exhibited hostile behavior when
approached by the police officer was a material fact issue that precluded
summary judgment based on good faith.
In Heikkila v. Harris County,10 2 the parents of a minor who died in a
fire appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Harris County
(County), in an action alleging that the county negligently released the
minor's remains to an unrelated family. The plaintiffs claimed severe
mental anguish damages because the negligent release of their son's body
prevented them from burying their son in an appropriate manner. The
Tyler Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's granting of the County's
motion for summary judgment on the basis that the County retained sov-
ereign immunity because the medical examiner who misidentified the
96. 971 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet. h.).
97. See id. at 736.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. 974 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet. h.).
101. See id. at 758.
102. 973 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1998, pet. denied).
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body was entitled to official immunity. 0 3 According to the court, the
summary judgment evidence on the record supported the finding that the
medical examiner's official immunity was established as a matter of law,
which shielded the County from any liability based on the medical exam-
iner's negligence.1 04
In Siders v. State,10 5 the victims in an automobile accident at the loca-
tion of an old stop sign near an improved highway filed an action against
the State and state engineers under the Texas Tort Claims Act for negli-
gently failing to remove the stop sign following the road improvements.
The plaintiffs appealed the trial court's granting of summary judgment in
favor of the defendants based on sovereign and official immunity. The
Dallas Court of Appeals held that the State's failure to remove the old
sign could not constitute negligent construction or maintenance of the
highway. 10 6 Moreover, the court held that the state engineers who
designed the project without removal of the old sign acted in good faith in
performing a discretionary function within the scope of their authority,
providing the engineers with official immunity.'0 7 In addition, the failure
of the State to include removal of the old sign in the plans and specifica-
tions for the construction project did not render the documents to be
"tangible property" under the Texas Tort Claims Act, which waives sover-
eign immunity for injury caused by the use of "tangible property."' 108
In Foster v. Estrada,10 9 the parents of a minor brought an action, indi-
vidually and as next friend, against the school principal and coach for
injuries the child sustained on school property. The San Antonio Court of
Appeals held that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether
the principal and coach were performing a discretionary or ministerial
duty. The Education Code provides an affirmative defense for school dis-
trict professional employees if the following requirements are satisfied:
(1) they were professional employees of the applicable school district at
the relevant time; (2) their actions, if any, were incident to or within the
scope of their duties at the relevant time; (3) their duties involve the exer-
cise of judgment or discretion; and (4) they did not use excessive force in
the discipline of the student.110
In Lyons v. Lindsey Morden Claims Management, Inc., 1 the plaintiff
was injured on the job while employed by El Paso Community College.
The plaintiff settled her workers' compensation claim against the self-in-
sured college, which hired the defendant, an independent claims adjusting
firm, to provide adjusting services for the plaintiff. After the defendant
103. See id. at 337.
104. See id.
105. 970 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1998, pet. denied).
106. See id. at 192.
107. See id. at 193-94.
108. See id. at 194.
109. 974 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. filed).
110. See id. at 753 (citing TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 22.051 (Vernon 1996)).
111. 985 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1998, no pet. h.).
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denied plaintiff's claims for medical care, she filed this suit against the
college and the claims adjusting firm alleging insurance code and DTPA
violations, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and conspir-
acy. The El Paso Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment and held that the defendant, as a matter of law, did
not establish an agency relationship between the adjusting firm and the
college to share the college's governmental immunity from liability.11 2
Lindsey Morden failed to establish the details of its professional relation-
ship with the college, and the extent of its right to control the adjusting
firm's actions specifically regarding the plaintiff's claim, rather than rely-
ing solely upon its own employee's testimony. Lindsey Morden's evi-
dence contained no contract of employment, no description of control by
the college of the firm's work, no explanation of the manner in which
Lindsey Morden was paid, nor any other facts supporting an agency
relationship. 113
B. TEXAS TORT CLAIMS AcT
As with official immunity, the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA)" 4 was
evaluated many times during the Survey period concerning the use of
tangible personal property. In Lamar University v. Doe,1 5 the parents of
minor children sued Lamar University under the TI'CA alleging that the
University was liable for the sexual misconduct of one of its students who
lived in a university dormitory and sexually assaulted and molested the
minors in the room. The court of appeals dismissed the action and held
that the parents failed to allege that the injuries suffered by the children
arose from the use of "tangible personal property" within the meaning of
section 101.021 of the TTCA.116 The plaintiffs did not establish that an
employee of the University negligently used personal property that proxi-
mately caused the plaintiffs' injuries. The occupant of the dormitory
room, rather than the dormitory room itself, caused the injuries to the
minor children.
In Dallas County Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Bossley,117 the
estate and parents of a patient brought a wrongful death action against
the facility, its workers, and physicians after the patient escaped from the
facility and threw himself in front of a truck. The plaintiffs alleged that
the defendants were negligent in failing to prevent the patient from es-
caping and committing suicide. The Texas Supreme Court held that the
unlocked doors of the facility through which the patient escaped were not
the proximate cause of the patient's death, and therefore, the facility's
immunity as a governmental unit was not waived under section
112. See id. at 90-91.
113. See id. at 90.
114. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 1999).
115. 971 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1998, no pet. h.).
116. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 1998).
117. 968 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. 1998).
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101.021(2) of the TTCA. 8 The court stated that property does not cause
injury if it does no more than furnish the condition that makes the injury
possible." 9 In this case, the court concluded that the unlocked doors per-
mitted the patient's escape, but did not cause his death.
In Smith v. City of Houston, 20 the plaintiff, an automobile passenger,
sued the City of Houston and a city employee for injuries she sustained in
a collision with a vehicle driven by the city employee. The trial court
granted summary judgment for the defendants based on the plaintiff's
failure to give formal notice of her claim under the TTCA and the Char-
ter of the City of Houston.12' The court of appeals held that the notice
provisions of section 101.101(a) of the TTCA and city charter did not
apply to the claims against the city employee. 122 These notice provisions
only apply to governmental units and the definition of "governmental
unit" in section 101.001(2) of the TTCA does not include an employee. 123
In addition, the court held that the City's deemed admission that the City
and employee received actual notice of the plaintiff's claim within the
applicable time period required by the TTCA resulted in a waiver of the
formal notice provisions.' 2 4
In Raymond v. Hanson,2 5 an automobile passenger injured in a colli-
sion with a tractor-trailer driven by a county employee brought an action
against Dallas County and the employee under the TTCA. The plaintiff
appealed the trial court's granting of defendants' summary judgment due
to the plaintiff's failure to comply with the presentment requirement in
section 81.041(a) of the Local Government Code.' 26 The court of appeals
held that the six-month notice requirement in section 101.101 of the
TTCA was the exclusive notice requirement for suits brought under the
TTCA, and local government requirements altering this section were un-
enforceable.' 2 7 The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in
the defendants' favor because the plaintiff was not required to comply
with section 81.041(a) of the Local Government Code before suing the
County under the TTCA.
In Salvatierra v. VIA Metropolitan Transit Authority,12 8 the parents of a
minor child sued the San Antonio Transit Authority for injuries sustained
by the child when he was struck by one of defendant's buses. The trial
court granted summary judgment in the plaintiffs' favor but limited dam-
ages to $100,000 based upon sovereign immunity under section
118. See id. at 343 (citing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021(2) (Vernon
1997)).
119. See id.
120. 960 S.W. 2d 326 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.).
121. See id. at 328.
122. See id.
123. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.001(3) (Vernon Supp. 1999).
124. See Smith, 960 S.W.2d at 328.
125. 970 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1998, no pet. h.)
126. TEX. LOCAL GOV'T CODE ANN. § 81.041(a) (Vernon 1988).
127. See Raymond, 970 S.W.2d at 178.
128. 974 S.W. 2d 179, 183 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied).
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101.023(b) of the TTCA. The plaintiffs appealed the imposition of the
cap. The court of appeals held that the damages cap did not violate the
open courts provision in Article I, Section 13 of the Texas Constitution. 129
The defendant is a public entity created in accordance with a statute that
provides a limited waiver of liability pursuant to the TTCA. The court
found nothing arbitrary about the limitations on waiver of immunity in
connection with the creation of mass transit authorities. The court of ap-
peals finally held that the damages cap did not violate the equal protec-
tion clause because all citizens who sustain an injury are limited to the
same damages cap regardless of the extent of their injuries. 130
In Hill v. City of Houston'3' the survivors of children who died in a
house fire brought an action against the City of Houston under section
1983, alleging violations of due process and equal protection under the
Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, as well as
pendent state claims under the Texas Tort Claims Act.132 The United
States District Court considered the defendant's motion to dismiss. The
district court held that the plaintiffs' allegations that the City neglected to
repair defective fire equipment, causing a delay in efforts to rescue the
children that resulted in their death, were sufficient to state a section 1983
claim for violation of substantive due process. 133 In addition, the district
court held that the plaintiffs' allegations that the City failed to maintain
and repair vehicles at a fire station located in a predominantly black
neighborhood, for the benefit of more affluent white neighborhoods
served by other fire stations, were sufficient to state an equal protection
violation claim under section 1983.134 Regarding the state law claims
brought under the TTCA, the district court held that the City's sovereign
immunity was waived under section 101.021 of the TICA based on the
defective condition or use of personal property. 135 The plaintiffs' allega-
tions were sufficient to state a claim under the TTCA because the plain-
tiffs alleged that the defendant failed to properly implement its own
policy regarding the repair of fire equipment and negligently imple-
mented its policy on responding to fire emergency calls.
C. FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS Acr / PREEMPTION
As with its state counterpart, the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) was
used often as a defensive tool in 1998, although not always successful.
The plaintiff in Linkous v. U.S.136 was a mother who sued the United
States and a physician under the FTCA, individually and on behalf of her
minor children, for injuries sustained during medical treatment at an
129. See id. at 184.
130. See id.
131. 991 F. Supp. 847 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
132. See id. at 849-52.
133. See id. at 850.
134. See id. at 851.
135. See id. at 852.
136. 142 F.3d 271 (5th Cir. 1998)
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army hospital. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the physi-
cian, who had contracted with the army hospital to provide ob/gyn serv-
ices to beneficiaries of the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the
Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS), was an independent contractor rather
than a federal employee. As such, the physician was not entitled to offi-
cial immunity. 137 In addition, the court held that the Government was
not equitably stopped from denying the physician's status as a govern-
ment employee for FTCA purposes. 138 The plaintiff failed to show the
required elements of affirmative misconduct by the Government and det-
rimental reliance to establish equitable estoppel, allowing the Govern-
ment to maintain its official immunity. 39
In Starnes v. U.S.,140 the parents of a deceased child brought an action
under the FICA against the United States Government alleging profes-
sional negligence on the part of a physician who was on active duty in the
United States Army and worked in a private hospital pursuant to a Mili-
tary Training Agreement.141 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the district court's finding that the physician was a borrowed servant of
the private hospital. The Court of Appeals concluded that the borrowed
servant defense did not apply to absolve the Government of liability for
the physician's alleged negligence.' 42 The fact that the physician was a
resident, as opposed to an attending physician, did not change the result
because of the expansive duties residents possess at hospitals.
In Rodriguez v. Sarabyn,143 the defendants, two Bureau of ATF
agents and a psychologist who worked for the ATF, brought this interloc-
utory appeal in an action initiated by an ATF agent to determine whether
the individual defendants were acting within the scope of their employ-
ment when they made the allegedly defamatory statements. The defend-
ant allegedly made the tortious statements to the media and in
subsequent investigations into the raid on the Branch Davidian Complex.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the psychologist was an in-
dependent contractor, rather than a federal employee, and therefore, the
FTCA did not shield the psychologist from individual liability. 44 How-
ever, the court held that the FTCA shielded the ATF agents from per-
sonal liability for statements made while the ATF employed each
agent. 45 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals applied Texas respondeat
superior liability law, which requires that the defamatory statements must
be: (1) referable to a duty owed by the employee to the employer; and (2)
made while the employee was in the process of discharging that duty. 46
137. See id. at 277.
138. See id. at 277-78.
139. See id. at 278.
140. 139 F. 3d 540 (5th Cir. 1998).
141. See id. at 541.
142. See id. at 543.
143. 129 F.3d 760 (5th Cir. 1997).
144. See id. at 765.
145. See id. at 766.
146. See id. at 767 (citing Texam Oil Corp. v. Poynor, 436 S.W. 2d 129, 130 (Tex. 1968)).
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The allegedly defamatory statements made by ATF agents to the media
and investigators about the plaintiff were made within the scope of their
employment, even if made to deflect scrutiny from themselves. 147
In Cazales v. Lecon, Inc.,'148 the family of a landscaping subcontractor's
employee brought a wrongful death and survival action in state court
against the general contractor of the United States Veterans Affairs De-
partment's cemetery expansion project after the employee was electro-
cuted while excavating. The general contractor brought this third party
claim against the United States in federal court. The district court ad-
dressed the United States Dept. of Veterans Affairs' (VA's) motions to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failing to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or in the alternative for summary
judgment. The district court granted the United States' motion for sum-
mary judgment. 149 The court specifically held that the VA's decision to
delegate responsibility for worker safety to the general contractor of a
cemetery expansion construction project fell within the discretionary
function exception to the FTCA. .5 0 Moreover, the court held that the
VA's decision to limit its contractually required safety inspections of the
construction project to weekly spot checks, and not to inspect areas in
which it would not expect to find VA employees, visitors, or patients, fell
within the discretionary function exception to the FTCA. 151 Without the
FICA elements to pierce governmental immunity, the third party claim
failed.
D. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
In a combined opinion, the Supreme Court of Texas decided two cases
regarding the statute of limitations in latent occupational disease cases.
In the first case, Childs v. Haussecker,152 the plaintiff brought a legal mal-
practice action against his attorney arising out of allegedly erroneous ad-
vice that the plaintiff's workers' compensation claim was time barred. In
the second case, Humble Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Martinez,153 a sand-
blaster brought products liability claims against the manufacturers and
suppliers of sandblasting equipment. The Texas Supreme Court held that
a cause of action for latent occupational disease cases does not accrue
until the plaintiff is on notice of the injury and knows or should have
known that the injury is likely work-related.15 4 In addition, the Court
held that issues of fact existed as to when the client and sandblaster
should have connected the symptoms of silicosis with their respective oc-
147. See id. at 772.
148. 994 F. Supp. 765 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
149. See id. at 776.
150. See id. at 774.
151. See id. at 776.
152. 974 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. 1998).
153. 980 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. filed).
154. See Childs, 974 S.W.2d at 40.
1999] 1367
SMU LAW REVIEW
cupational exposure to silica dust.155
In DeLoitte & Touche v. Weller,156 a class of investors in a limited part-
nership sued DeLoitte & Touche for accounting malpractice after the IRS
audited and assessed penalties against the partnership. DeLoitte &
Touche appealed the trial court's judgment, arguing that the statute of
limitations barred the suit. The court of appeals concluded that the ac-
crual of the statute of limitations in professional negligence cases begins
when the professional advice is followed. 157 In the event the injury is not
yet identifiable, for example, the advice has not yet been recognized as
inappropriate, the victim may invoke the discovery rule to toll the accrual
date to the time when the injury was or should have been discovered.158
In this case, several of the limited partners had sufficient information to
have recognized the injury more than two years prior to the date the ac-




In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Ellender,160 the surviving family members and
the administrator of the estate of a contractor who died of leukemia filed
a lawsuit against Mobil Oil, alleging that the decedent's exposure to ben-
zene at the defendant's facility caused the decedent's death. The
Supreme Court of Texas held that there was legally sufficient evidence of
gross negligence on the defendant's part.161 The court found that there
was evidence that Mobil's own actions and omissions involved an ex-
treme degree of risk to contract workers like the decedent. The evidence
showed that Mobil vice principals' had knowledge that by not providing
protective gear, not monitoring, and not warning workers about benzene
exposure was an extreme risk to contract workers, like the decedent, who
regularly had contact with benzene while employed by Mobil.' 62 The
court further held that the Beaumont Court of Appeals should not have
recalculated the cap on punitive damages when that issue was not ap-
pealed. 163 Moreover, the defendant met its burden of proving the
amount of family members' settlement with other defendants as a basis
for credit. Finally, the court held that the family members had the burden
to show what portion of the settlement was non-creditable punitive dam-
ages. 164 A corporation can be held liable in punitive damages for gross
155. See id. at 47.
156. 976 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1998, pet. denied).
157. See id. at 216 (citing Murphy v. Campbell, 964 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. 1997)).
158. See id.
159. See id. at 219.
160. 968 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. 1998).
161. See id. at 924.
162. See id.
163. See id. at 926.
164. See id. at 928.
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negligence if the corporation itself commits gross negligence or grossly
negligent acts or omissions can be attributed to the corporation. 165
In Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone,166 the plaintiffs brought
several different product liability suits against Owens-Corning, which
were consolidated for trial. In this appeal of the judgments in favor of the
plaintiffs, the Texas Supreme Court addressed what evidence, beyond the
defendant's net worth, is admissible in the jury's consideration of punitive
damages. The court concluded that:
Texas law should allow defendants to introduce some evidence to
mitigate punitive damages. Accordingly, we hold that evidence
about the profitability of a defendant's misconduct and about any
settlement amounts for punitive damages or prior punitive damages
awards that the defendant has actually paid for the same course of
conduct is admissible when the defendant offers it in mitigation of
punitive damages. 167
The Texas Supreme Court, however, went on to hold that the number of
pending claims, the actual damage awards, anticipated claims and awards,
insurance coverage, and unpaid awards were neither relevant nor admis-
sible as an effort to mitigate punitive damages.168 Furthermore, argu-
ments by the defendant that repetitive punitive damage verdicts violated
the defendant's due process rights were unpersuasive: "We therefore con-
clude, as have other courts when considering OCF's same arguments
under similar facts, that 'the evidence produced by OCF falls short of
demonstrating a due process violation.'1 69
B. INSURANCE ISSUES
In State Farm Lloyds v. Performance Improvement Corp.,170 State
Farm filed declaratory judgment action concerning liability insurance cov-
erage for a lawsuit for an alleged child molestation. The mother of the
child sued the insured, Performance Improvements Corporation (PIC),
alleging that the child had been molested by a maintenance employee
who had been screened and tested by PIC on behalf of the apartment
complex where the child lived.171 The San Antonio Court of Appeals
held that the insured's act of screening employment applicants was a
"professional service" within the meaning of the exclusion of the cover-
age for injury or damage due to the rendering or failure to render any
professional service. 172 The facts established as a matter of law that the
liability of PIC in the underlying lawsuit was based solely upon its man-
agement consulting, a professional service, rather than on the sale of a
165. See id.
166. 972 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. 1998).
167. Id. at 40.
168. See id. at 41.
169. Id. at 53.
170. 974 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied).
171. See id. at 136.





In Rosenthal v. Grocers Supply Co., Inc.,174 Grocers Supply hired a
contractor to clear some land of trees and brush. Grocers then showed
the contractor the land that it wish the contractor to clear. The plaintiff
confronted the subcontractor while the subcontractor was clearing the
trees and claimed that the subcontractor was mistakenly clearing the
plaintiff's land. During that confrontation, the subcontractor injured the
plaintiff. In this suit against Grocers, plaintiff argues that Grocers can be
held vicariously liable for the actions of their independent contractor.
The court reversed the trial court's summary judgment holding that since
Grocers controlled a vital "detail" performance by the independent con-
tractor (identifying the land to clear), there is a "fact issue on liability,
both as to Grocer's responsibility for the contractor's acts and also as to
Grocer's responsibility for its own error."'1 75
D. CLASS ACTIONS
In Southwestern Refining Co., Inc. v. Bernal,176 the defendant filed an
interlocutory appeal challenging the class certification and trial plan or-
dered by the trial court in an action alleging personal injuries resulting
from a tank explosion at a refinery. The court of appeals affirmed the
class certification and modified the certification order to postpone an as-
sessment of punitive damages until after the actual damages of the class
representatives have been determined. In evaluating the class certifica-
tion order under an abuse of discretion standard, the court of appeals
focused on the gains in judicial efficiency provided by class certification in
this case. Treating the 904 plaintiffs as a class, rather than as a large
group of joined plaintiffs, provided substantial benefits in economy and
trial management. Moreover, enormous gains in judicial efficiency would
also be realized by allowing a single trial to resolve liability issues for the
entire class. The court of appeals held that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in separating the determination of whether the defendants
were negligent from whether the plaintiffs suffered damages caused by
that negligence. 177
E. SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE
Reversing a well-reasoned opinion, the Texas Supreme Court departed
from the majority of states in a negligent record-keeping case. In Trevino
v. Ortega, 78 a parent of a girl injured at birth sued the physician for
173. See id.
174. 981 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.)
175. Id. at 222.
176. 960 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, pet. granted).
177. See id. at 298.
178. 969 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. 1998).
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intentional spoliation of evidence, which allegedly prejudiced the parent's
opportunity to obtain damages in a medical malpractice action. The
Supreme Court of Texas held that Texas does not recognize an independ-
ent tort cause of action for the spoliation of evidence. 179 The court stated
that spoliation of evidence does not give rise to independent damages and
declined to create a new cause of action. 180 Moreover, the spoliation of
evidence is better remedied within the lawsuit affected by the spoliation,
rather than by providing a party with an independent cause of action to
remedy evidence destruction.
179. See id. at 951.
180. See id.
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